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Abstract 
People’s risky decisions are susceptible to the social context in which they take place. Across 
three experiments using different paradigms, we investigated the influence of three social 
factors upon participants’ decisions: the recipient of the decision-making outcome (self, other, 
or joint), the nature of the relationship with the other agent (friend, stranger, or teammate), and 
the type of information that participants received about others’ preferences: none at all, general 
information about how previous participants had decided, or information about a specific 
partner’s preference. We found that participants’ decisions about risk did not differ according 
to whether the outcome at stake was their own, another agent’s, or a joint outcome, nor 
according to the type of information available. Participants did, however, adjust their 
preferences for risky options in light of social information. 
 





-      We extend the literature on how social context influences decisions about risk. 
-      Risky decision-making did not generally differ according to who the recipient was.  
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Introduction 
In everyday life, we often have to choose between options with differing levels of risk and 
reward, such as when we must decide whether to take the shorter but more traffic-prone of 
two routes to work, or whether to invest our savings in risky but potentially lucrative stocks 
as opposed to keeping them safely in the bank. Given the centrality and importance of risky 
decision-making, it is no wonder that there has been a wealth of research investigating 
contextual factors influencing such decisions, such as whether the outcome of the decision is 
framed as a potential gain or loss (Benjamin & Robbins, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), 
and whether the risk pertains to physical health or to financial investments (Weber, Blais & 
Betz, 2002). 
More recently, there has been a surge of interest in the social factors that may 
influence risky decision-making. For example, researchers have begun to investigate whether 
risky decision-making differs according to who the recipient of the decision-making outcome 
is. This question is important insofar as people make risky decisions on behalf of others every 
day, and this skill is essential for many professions. For example, financial managers suggest 
and guide the decisions of their clients about how to arrange their investments, doctors 
suggest courses of treatment with uncertain outcomes to their patients, and we all make 
decisions for our relatives and friends. If there are systematic differences in the decisions 
people make about risk when deciding for themselves or for others, this would have serious 
implications for regulators, policymakers and other professionals.  
So far, however, the research findings on self-other differences in risky choice have 
produced mixed results (Polman & Wu, 2019). Some studies find that people make riskier 
decisions for others than for themselves (e.g. Agranov, Bisin, & Schotter, 2014; Chakravarty, 
Harrison, Haruvy & Rutsrom, 2011), while other studies have suggested that decisions for 
others tend to be more risk averse (e.g. Atanasov, 2015; Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010; Wang et 
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al., 2017). Self-other differences in risky decision-making have been suggested to vary 
depending on the independent variables manipulated in experiments, such as the number of 
other individuals implicated by the decision (Eijkelenboom, Rohde, & Vostroknutov, 2018), 
whether the risky outcomes involve losses (Atanasov, 2015; Raue, Streicher, Lermer, & Frey, 
2015), and whether participants harbour competitive or pro-social motives (Olschewski, 
Dietsch, & Ludvig, 2019). 
One theoretical proposal that has been offered in the literature is that differences in 
decision-making for self and others may be driven by a sense of responsibility for the 
outcomes of decisions and/or anticipation of blame should the decision result in negative 
outcomes for others (Botti, Orfali, & Iyengar, 2009; Simonson, 1992; Stone et al., 2002; 
Wang et al., 2017). If this blame-avoidance hypothesis is correct and most people are risk-
averse, people would be more conservative -- i.e. risk-averse -- when deciding on behalf of 
others. In addition, blame avoidance may lead people to choose options that are easily 
justified to reduce any potential blame if the outcome turns out to be suboptimal (Kray, 
2000). Blame avoidance may also lead people to make more risk-seeking decisions under 
some circumstances, such as when they believe that their partner is highly risk-seeking and 
are thus inclined to accommodate the other’s preference in order to avoid blame. 
A distinct theoretical view that has been proposed to account for self-other differences 
in risky decision-making is based on construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
Broadly, this theory argues that psychological distance from a decision influences the types 
of representations and considerations people take into account during decision-making (Trope 
& Liberman, 2010). Various factors such as temporal distance, probability, and social 
distance contribute to psychological distance (Bar-Anan, Liberman & Trope, 2006; Liberman 
& Trope, 2014; Bhatia & Walasek, 2016), with self-other distinctions being one form of 
social distance (Liberman, Trope, & Stephan, 2007; Lu, Xie, & Xu, 2012). Decisions for 
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others are hypothesized to involve greater psychological distance, and thus to be shaped by 
more abstract, context-independent, and reason-driven considerations. Conversely, decisions 
for self are hypothesized to involve less psychological distance, and thus to be shaped by 
lower-level concrete representations with greater emphasis on context-specific factors 
(Liberman et al., 2007; Polman & Emich, 2011). Such psychological distance has been 
shown to influence risk preferences. Participants who are primed with high rather than low 
construal take more risks, as they pay more attention to the highest positive outcome and 
become insensitive to probability (Lermer et al, 2015; Streicher et al., 2012; Streicher et al., 
2015). Consequently, construal level theory predicts that people should be more risk averse 
when they make decisions for themselves as opposed to when their decisions affect others.  
Drawing upon these competing theoretical proposals and mixed empirical evidence, 
we designed three different experiments with diverse manipulations to probe a range of 
hypotheses about the influence of social information on risky decision-making and about self-
other differences in risky decision-making. In all three experiments, the design was such that 
an increase in risk-seeking would lead to an increase in monetary payoffs. In all three 
experiments, we use variants of the paradigms in which participants must make decision 
based on their experience. As such, in all experiments we probe the relation between 
decision-making for self and others in situations where participants can learn and adjust their 
responses. 
According to the blame-avoidance hypothesis, participants should avoid blame by 
making more conservative choices when they lack information about their partner’s 
preferences (Experiments 1 and 2). This would lead to more risk-averse decisions – which, in 
the context of our experiments, would always have led to lower monetary outcomes. In 
addition, Experiment 1 manipulates the amount of information available to participants about 
how generic others have previously decided. If decision-making for others is characterized by 
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blame-avoidance, we should expect that when deciding for others, participants should place 
more weight on information about how generic others have previously decided, compared to 
when deciding for themselves. This is because such information would provide a basis for 
justifying the decision and thereby minimize blame.  
As a further test of this idea, we provide participants in Experiment 3 with 
information about their specific partner’s personal preference with respect to risk tolerance. 
Under these circumstances, the blame-avoidance hypothesis in fact provides a reason to 
expect greater risk-seeking: insofar as blame-avoidance is a critical factor in decision-making 
for others, participants should be inclined to use this information to align their decisions with 
the decisions their partner could be expected to make. Given that they have reason to ascribe 
a preference for high risk-seeking to their partners in Experiment 3, this should lead to greater 
risk-seeking when their partner’s earning are at stake than when only their own earnings are 
at stake -- and to more overall earnings on the task. 
In contrast, construal level theory generates a different set of predictions for these 
experiments. Most importantly, this theory predicts greater risk-seeking when deciding for 
others than when deciding for self in these experiments. Because in our tasks risk-seeking 
behavior leads to higher money outcomes, construal level theory predicts that participants 
should earn more money when making decisions for others. Experiment 1 of the current 
study tests this hypothesis directly by manipulating the recipient of the decision-making 
outcome (Self vs Other). More generally, according to the theory, any factors that reduce 
social distance to the recipient of the decision-making outcome should increase risk-averse 
behavior. As a test of this prediction, Experiment 2 varies the nature of the participant’s 
relationship to the non-self recipient (Friend or Stranger). Construal level theory predicts 
greater risk aversion when deciding for a friend than when deciding for a stranger in this 
scenario, as friends are psychologically closer than unknown individuals. Experiment 3 also 
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varies the nature of the interaction with the partner (Coordination or No Coordination); in 
principle, construal level theory should predict greater risk aversion when engaged in a 
tightly coordinated joint action with a partner than when not coordinating because tight 
coordination may reduce psychological distance.  
In the following sections, we provide precise hypotheses for each experiment. Table 1 
summarizes the broad structure of our empirical investigation. 
Table 1. Overview of tasks and manipulations in the three experiments. 
 
 Task Manipulations 
Experiment 1 Risky choice from 
experience  
- Strength of social 
information  
- Recipient (self or 
other) 
Experiment 2 BART - Recipient (self, friend 
or stranger) 
Experiment 3 BART - Degree of 
coordination with 
partner  






Most studies examining self-other differences in risky choice have used a decision-
from-description paradigm, which consists of pairwise choice problems between a safe and 
risky option (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1981). These problems are presented as explicitly 
described probabilities and corresponding outcomes, based on which participants make 
choices. In the real world, however, the riskiness of available options must often be learned 
through experience. And indeed, risky decisions are significantly different when made from 
description or from experience (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004; Ludvig & Spetch, 2011). Thus, we 
adopted a decision-from-experience paradigm here, where the outcomes and their 
probabilities are unknown at first and can only be learned by sampling from the available 
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options (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). This method was chosen because it provided the opportunity 
for the participants to learn the outcomes and the underlying probabilities by themselves. The 
design of the task used in this experiment was adapted from Olschewski et al. (2019) and 
aimed to probe the following three pre-registered hypotheses: 
First, we probed whether social information in the form of illustrated proportions of 
previous participant choices can influence risky decisions from experience (see Fig 1). 
Building upon empirical evidence that social information can influence behaviour across 
various contexts (Parks et al., 2001), we predicted that:  
 
 
(P1) participants’ risky decisions from experience would be influenced by the social 
information about past choices made by others. 
 
            In addition, whereas many studies have explored self-other differences in various 
contexts, none have explicitly focused on whether decision-makers rely on social information 
differently when deciding for self or others. Some existing research suggests that people 
make decisions for others that are easy to justify (Kray, 2000) so as to avoid potential 
feelings of guilt, regret, or blame (Stone et al., 2002; Wang et al., 2017). Building on this 
research, we hypothesize that when deciding for others, social information may be taken into 
greater consideration as decision-makers place greater emphasis on desirability factors, and 
that the social information may be regarded as a convenient justification that helps reduce 
responsibility for potential negative outcomes when people make decisions for others. As 
such, we predicted that: 
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(P2) decision-makers are more likely to be influenced by social information when making 
decisions for others than when deciding for themselves; and, as a later refinement, that: 
 
(P3) this magnitude of social influence depends on the strength of the social information. 
  
Finally, we also sought to explore the relationship between the amount of experience 
a decision-maker has and the influence of social information. In each round of the 
experiment, the number of samples participants made prior to a decision was varied, 
manipulating the amount of experience they had regarding the payout range of each gamble. 
Existing literature indicates that people are likely to give greater weight to private than social 
information (Puskaric et al., 2017; Weizsacker, 2010). We therefore expect that when 
participants have insufficient experience, they are likely to rely on social information more 
heavily. Thus, we predicted that: 
 
(P4) there would be a negative relationship between the number of samples prior to decision 
and the influence of social information – i.e., participants’ decisions would align less with 
social information about choices of others when they had more samples prior to decision.  
             
 In addition, we explored a further set of questions that arose post hoc. Most 
importantly, we were interested in whether participants had exhibited different overall levels 
of risk seeking when deciding for self or other in this paradigm. In the experiment, the 
options were set such that the riskier option always had a higher expected value than the safer 
option. Two hypotheses currently in the literature thus lead to competing predictions in this 
experiment. Construal level theory hypothesizes that greater psychological distance from the 
decision when choosing on behalf of someone else would lead participants to take more 
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information into account and to earn more money (here become more risk seeking). It 
therefore predicts that: 
 
(P5a) participants should make be more risk seeking and earn more points when deciding on 
behalf of the partner.  
 
In this experiment, this increased earnings would result in greater risk-seeking. In contrast, 
the blame-avoidance hypothesis predicts that: 
 
(P5b) participants should make more risk-averse decisions, leading to fewer points, when 
deciding for others.  
  
A 2 x 3 within-subject design with one additional randomized variable was used to 
address the hypotheses. The first independent variable was the recipient of participant choice 
– Self or Other. The second independent variable was the strength of social information – 
Strong (10% and 90%), Weak (30% and 70%), or Neutral (50%). Each of the 5 levels of 
social information (10%, 30%, 50%, 70% and 90%) was operationalized as the proportion of 
previous participants who chose the riskier of the two provided options. The 10% and 90% 
levels of social information were regarded as Strong social information because participants 
were shown a larger majority of previous participants choosing either option. Conversely, the 
30% and 70% levels of social information were classified as Weak social information. 
The first 4 hypotheses, sample sizes, methods, and initial analyses were all pre-
registered before data collection. The pre-registration and Matlab script used for this 
experiment as well as all the raw data can be accessed at: 
https://osf.io/t4bzf/?view_only=4f6d5d6eaf464ed1aa95fcb6a46dd594 






A total of 69 participants (26 males, 42 females, 1 undisclosed, Mage = 24.3 years, SDage = 
3.86 years) were recruited via the University of Warwick SONA paid research online sign-up 
system. Participants were recruited in 7 sessions of between 6 to 12 participants per session, 
with each session lasting approximately 30 minutes. Each participant was compensated with 
a £2 show-up fee and had the opportunity to win up to an additional £6.50. The mean 
payment received by participants was £5.38 (range: £3.30 - £8.40). The experiment was 
conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and was approved by the 
Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee at the University of Warwick. 
Among the 69 recruited participants, six were excluded as per the pre-registered 
exclusion criteria for failing the manipulation check during the experiment (choosing the 
dominated option on the catch trial). The data from these participants were excluded from 
data analysis, leaving N = 63 for all reported analyses. The 63 participants met the target set 
at pre-registration of recruiting at least 60 participants. Power analyses indicated that for a 
medium effect size (d = 0.40) and an alpha level of .05, approximately 55 participants were 
required for 90% experimental power.  
 
Materials 
The experiment was presented to participants as a game comprising 21 rounds. On each 
round, gambles were represented by images such as treasure chests, and the number of 
sample plays left on a particular round was denoted by images such as coins serving as 
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counters. Figure 1 provides an example of the screen display for the sampling phase. The 
social information was illustrated using a total of 20 cartoon characters, with the relative 
number of cartoon characters above each gamble representing the proportion of previous 
participants who chose each gamble. The levels of social information were manipulated by 
adjusting the number of cartoon characters above each gamble. Figure 1B provides an 
example of the screen display for the choice phase, using the 90% social information 
condition, illustrating 18 cartoon characters above one gamble and two cartoon characters 
above the other. Note that the social information did not in fact represent actual past 
participants, but was explicitly manipulated as the independent variable.  
  
Figure 1. (A) Screenshot of Sampling Phase. The two treasure chests represent the gambles, 
and the number of coins represents the number of samples left. (B) Screenshot of social 
information and instructions shown on the decision screen. In this example, the social 
information shows 90% of the previous participants choosing the gamble on the right, and 
participants are told that they are choosing for themselves in this round. 
Across the experiment, 4 sets of pictures were used. Each set consisted of 3 different 
pictures used to illustrate the gambles, the number of samples remaining, and the cartoon 
characters representing previous participant choices. Each set of pictures was randomly 
allocated to 5 of the 20 test rounds, and a randomly selected set was used once more for the 
catch round. All stimulus images are available at the OSF repository. 
 
BA
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Procedure 
All experimental sessions took place in a computer lab at the University of Warwick. 
Upon arrival, each participant was randomly assigned to a cubicle with a Windows desktop 
computer equipped with a standard keyboard. Participants were given general instructions 
regarding the experiment as well as a participant demographic information sheet to fill in.  
After giving their informed written consent, participants were asked to begin reading 
through further instructions regarding the experiment on their respective desktop screens. 
Participants were told that they would be making decisions for themselves on some rounds, 
and for a randomly selected other participant on other rounds. They were also informed that 
the final payment from the experiment would be their show-up fee plus the average of the 
payout from a randomly selected gamble they played for themselves and the payout from a 
randomly selected gamble another participant in the room had played for them. Verbatim 
instructions are provided in the Appendix. 
During the study, each participant played a total of 21 rounds (20 test rounds and 1 
catch round). Each round consisted of two phases: the sampling phase, followed by the 
decision phase (see Fig 1). During the sampling phase, participants sampled from the two 
available gambles between 6 and 24 times to learn about the possible outcomes from each 
gamble. During the sampling phase, participants were allowed to sample the two gambles in 
any order they wished at their own pace and had to finish all allotted sample plays as denoted 
by the number of counters left on the screen.  
On all rounds, the two gambles each had payouts drawn from a uniform distribution 
with a mean payout and payout range that were determined as follows: the mean payout for 
the safer gamble was randomly set between £2.5 and £3.5 with a payout range of ±£0.5 from 
that mean. The riskier gamble had a mean payout set exactly £0.5 higher than the safe 
gamble, but with a larger range of ±£3 from that mean, representing a risk-return trade-off. 
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Partial feedback was provided for each sample play: directly above the chosen gamble, the 
outcome was displayed in text, while nothing appeared above the unsampled one. After 
completing the sampling phase, participants transitioned to the decision phase. 
The decision phase on each round began with on-screen instructions stating that 
participants would now be asked to choose one of the two gambles they had just sampled to 
play out for real either for themselves or for a random other participant in the room. 
Participants then had to press a key to continue to the decision screen. The top of the decision 
screen indicated whether the recipient of the outcome of this choice would be themselves or 
someone else. Social information was presented to participants on this screen in the form of 
proportions of previous participants who had chosen each gamble to play out for real (see 
Figure 1B). The relative number of cartoon characters on top of each gamble illustrated the 
social information. The social information purportedly represented 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, or 
90% of previous participants picking the riskier option (2, 6, 10, 14, or 18 of the 20 cartoon 
characters). This involved a mild form of deception which was necessary in order to 
implement our experimental manipulation: the social information on each round was pre-
determined as the key independent variable manipulated in the study and did not represent the 
actual behaviour of past participants. 
Participants made selections by pressing the “J” or “K” key for the gamble presented 
on the left or right of their screens respectively. Unlike the sample plays, participants did not 
receive feedback for their choices. Each round concluded after participants had made their 
decision on the decision screen. Between the sampling and decision phases on each round 
and between rounds, on-screen instructions prompted participants to press any key on the 
keyboard to proceed. Participants were allowed to finish the sample plays and to make the 
final decision on each round at their own pace.  
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This general procedure was repeated for all 21 rounds. The 20 test rounds comprised 
2 sets of the 2 (decisions for self or others) x 5 levels of social information (10%, 30%, 50%, 
70% or 90% favoring the risky option), with the 10 possible numbers of sample plays for 
each round being independently and randomly allocated across each set of 10 rounds. In the 
catch round, participants were presented with a gamble that clearly dominated the other in a 
decision for self, with social information showing that 90% of previous participants picked 
the dominating gamble. The samples for the dominated gamble were drawn from a uniform 
distribution between 0 and 1, and the samples for the dominating gamble were drawn from a 
uniform distribution between 5 and 6. Participants who selected the dominated gamble during 
the decision phase in the catch round were deemed to have failed the catch round and were 
excluded from the analysis. The order of appearance of all test and catch rounds was 
randomised for each participant to prevent order effects. At the end of the experiment, exactly 
as described to participants at the outset of the experiment, two rounds (one for self and one 
for other) were selected randomly and realized, and participants were paid accordingly. 
 
Data Processing and Analysis 
The primary dependent measure was the proportion of risky choices for each level of social 
information and/or number of samples. In addition, post-hoc, we created a second dependent 
measure of social influence score, which represented the degree to which participant’s choice 
was influenced by the displayed social information. The social influence score replaced the 
original pre-registered dependent measure, which was abandoned because it did not take into 
account the baseline risk preference for each participant in the neutral social information 
condition. The social influence score was derived by calculating the difference, for each 
participant, between their baseline risk level (from the 50% social info) and the proportion 
risky choice with social information. In the 10% and 30% social information conditions, 
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where the social information indicated that the majority chose the safer option, social 
influence scores were derived by subtracting the proportion of risky choices from their 
baseline. Conversely, in the 70% and 90% social information conditions, the calculation was 
reversed, and social influence scores were derived by subtracting their baseline from the 
proportion of risky choices in each condition. Positive and negative social influence scores 
thus represent proportions of decisions deviating away from one’s baseline risk preference 
towards or away from the social information, respectively. 
Analyses of the proportion risky choice generally followed our pre-registered data 
analysis plan, except where indicated. Data processing, plotting, and statistical analyses were 
conducted using R Studio (Version 1.1.383) and SPSS (Version 22). Bayesian ANOVAs 
were calculated in R using ‘anovaBF’ function from Package ‘BayesFactor’. Because no 
random factors were specified, the null model assumed by ‘anovaBF’ was the grand-mean 
only model. The analyses with the social influence scores were all conducted post-hoc. 
Results 
Overall, participants chose the risky option 58.7 ± 9.1% of the time for themselves, 
very slightly less than the 60.2 ± 9.5% when choosing for others. Figure 2A shows the mean 
proportion of risky decisions for each level of social information. Participants were sensitive 
to the level of social information, picking more riskily when the social information indicated 
that others had done so, but not differently for self and other. A 3 x 2 repeated-measures 
ANOVA confirmed a main effect of Social Information strength (70%-90% as riskier and 
10%-30% as safer, and 50% as neutral social information) (F (2,126) =17.87, p <0.001, ηp
2 = 
0.221, BF10 = 716 × 10
7), but no significant effect of Recipient F (1,63) =0.68, p =.413, ηp
2 = 
0.011, BF10 = 0.113), nor any interaction (F(2,126) =0.68, p =.509 , ηp
2 = 0.011, BF10 = 271 × 
104. Ex-post statistical power analyses indicated that, given the sample size, this test had 65% 
power for detecting an effect size d = 0.3, 97% for d = 0.5, and 100% for d = 0.7.  
 Social risk 17 
 
Figure 2. Results from Experiment 1. (A) Proportion of risky decisions increases as a 
function of the displayed percentage of previous participants choosing the risky gamble and 
the overall social influence. (B) Social influence score as a function of strength of social 
information (strong or weak) and decision target (self or other). Error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals (CI) of the mean. 
 
Participants were, however, very sensitive to the difference in reward between the 
safe and risky options on trials with neutral social information (50%), as indicated by a 
correlation between proportion risky and the magnitude of the difference across trials, r(61) = 
.379, p = .002, BF10 = 6.742. 
To further evaluate how social information impacted decisions for self and others, we 
calculated a social influence score (see methods), which indicated how much people deviated 
from the baseline risk preference due to the social information. Figure 2B shows, how, on 
average, people altered their risk preference by 11.6 ± 4.0 percentage points based on the 
social information (one-sample t(62) = 5.81, p< .001, d= 0.731, BF10 = 75959.26). The 
average social influence score was marginally higher (5.36 percentage points, with 95% CI [-
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ηp
2= 0.064, BF10= 0.292], but there was no reliable effect of recipient [F(1,62) = 0.302, p = 
0.584, ηp
2= 0.005, BF10= 0.111], nor any interaction [F(1,62) = 0.042, p= .839, ηp
2= 0.001, 
BF10= 0.031]. Ex-post statistical power analyses for the factor Recipient indicated that, given 
the sample size, this test had 64% power for detecting an effect size d = 0.3, 97% for d = 0.5, 
and 100% for d = 0.7.  
A further question was whether social information would have less of an impact as 
participants had more experience. Figure 3 illustrates how, contrary to our expectations, the 
impact of social information, as indexed by the social influence score, actually grew slightly 
with the number of samples. To quantify this pattern, we conducted a linear-trend analysis. 
Simple linear regressions were fit for each participant, using the number of samples as the 
predictor variable and social influence score (averaged across strong and weak) as the 
predicted variable. The average predictor coefficient (b = 0.0068, 95% CI [0.0018, 0.012]) 
was significantly different from 0, one-sample t(62) = 2.73, p = .008, d = 0.34, BF10 = 4.001. 
This result means that with each additional sample drawn, the percentage of decisions that 
were aligned with the majority decision in the social information grew on average by 0.68 
percentage points. 
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Figure 3. Average participant social influence score increased as a function of number of pre-
decision samples, illustrating a positive relationship between the number of samples and 




We implemented a decision-making experiment using a decision-from-experience 
paradigm focusing on how two aspects of social context may influence risky decisions for 
self and others: the recipient of the risky decision (Self or Other) and the strength of 
information about how others have chosen when faced with the same decision (Neutral, 
Weak, or Strong).   
First, we found evidence to support the prediction (P1) that participants’ risky 
decisions from experience would be significantly influenced by the social information. We 
 Social risk 20 
did not, however, find evidence to support the prediction (P2) that decision-makers are more 
likely to be influenced by social information when making decisions for others than when 
they are deciding for themselves. There also was not a significant interaction between the 
recipient of decision outcomes and the strength of social information, although stronger 
social information did result in significantly higher proportions of decisions aligning with the 
social information for both self and other.  
Thus, the results do not support (P3), i.e., social influence would be greater when the 
social information is strong than when it is weak. These two predictions (P2 and P3) were 
motivated by the hypothesis that decisions for others would comply with social information 
more, because social information might serve as a possible justification when making 
decisions for others, helping to avoid blame in the event of an unfavourable outcome.  
 In Experiment 1 we also sought to explore the relationship between the amount of 
experience a decision-maker had, operationalised by the number of samples, and the 
influence of social information when making risky decisions from experience. We predicted 
(P4) that there would be a negative relationship between the number of samples and the 
alignment with social information – i.e., participants’ decisions would align less to social 
information when they had more samples. Unexpectedly, we found that decisions were more 
likely to align with social information when there were more opportunities to sample. One 
speculative explanation for this finding is that participants may have reasoned that the other 
participants had more information by virtue of the longer sampling period, so the social 
information was more likely to be reliable. Of course, they themselves also had more 
information, but the reliability attributed to the social information may have increased more 
as a result of the extended sampling period than the reliability attributed to their own private 
information. 
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Finally, we did not find evidence to support either the prediction (P5a) that 
participants would make more risk seeking choices and earn more points when deciding for 
the partner, nor the opposite prediction (P5b) that they would make more risk-averse when 
deciding for their partner 
 
Experiment 2 
The results of Experiment 1 did not reveal any significant differences in participants’ 
willingness to take risky decisions when the outcome at stake was their own compared to 
when it was the outcome of a randomly selected other participant.  
To further test the robustness of our findings in Experiment 2, we used another 
experience-based risk task: the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART). In the BART, 
participants are required to pump a virtual balloon to accrue points, which are converted to 
money. At any point, a participant can bank and save all earnings from a given trial. If the 
balloon bursts, however, all earnings for that trial are lost. The BART has the further virtue of 
being better correlated with real-life risk taking than many other behavioural measures (Frey 
et al., 2017; Hunt, Hopko, Bare, Lejuez, & Robinson, 2005; Lejuez et al., 2002).  
In Experiment 2, we also sought to further test predictions of construal level theory by 
manipulating the social distance to the partner and having our participants earn money in the 
risk task for themselves, for a friend, or for a stranger. In the BART task, the maximal 
expected earnings are reached when the balloon is pumped exactly 64 out of the 128 
maximum times (Wallsten, Pleskac & Lejuez, 2005), yet people tend to be risk averse and 
pump well below that (e.g., Lejuez et al., 2002). Thus, in this task, more risk-seeking 
behaviour typically leads to higher earnings. Thus, extending our earlier prediction (P5a), we 
expected that:  
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(P6) Risk-seeking behaviour should increase with social distance, and therefore participants 
should earn more money in the BART for a friend than themselves, and even more money for 
a stranger than for themselves. 
 
 
Data and materials for Experiment 2 can be viewed at 
https://osf.io/rgjt6/?view_only=98639867fb59432f8ba020d60144c2d8/. Experiment 2 was 






75 participants signed up to participate in the study through the University of Warwick 
participant pool. Each participant also brought one friend to the lab so there were 150 
participants in total (97 female, Mage= 21.3, SDage= 2.7). We sought at least 45 participants 
per group to achieve 80% statistical power to detect a medium (f = 0.27) effect size (based on 
the omnibus one-way ANOVA with mean differences in mean adjusted pumps of 5, with 
standard deviations of 15). Computer error led to data loss from three participants, and one 
participant failed the manipulation check, resulting in the final sample of 146 responses (self: 
52, friend: 48, stranger: 46; sufficient to detect an effect size of f = 0.26). The experiment was 
conducted in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and was approved by the 
Humanities & Social Sciences Research Ethics Sub-committee (HSSREC) at the University 
of Warwick. 
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The recruitment page specified that each participant would earn a minimum of £3 and 
a maximum of £15 for approximately 30 minutes of their time. They were aware that the £3 
flat fee would be payable in cash at the end of the experiment, but that the remaining 
earnings, which could be based on their performance, would be transferred into their student 
account within 5 working days from the day of the experimental session. Each person was 
further told that the only way to be eligible for the study was to bring a friend to the lab with 
them. They were also informed that the friend would be treated as a participant and would be 
rewarded in the same way as them. 
 
Materials 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task  
The classic 30-round version of the BART was used in the study (Lejuez et al., 2002). We 
used the version implemented in the Inquisit software package (Version 5.0.010.0). In the 
task, participants were shown an image of a balloon and told that they could earn money by 
pressing on the “pump up the balloon” button. Figure 4 shows a screenshot in task, wherein 
the size of the balloon increased incrementally with each pump. Earnings from each round 
could be secured and added to the total (here bank) by pressing on the “collect points” button. 
If the balloon burst, all earnings for that round would be lost. The objective of the task was to 
earn as much money as possible. In the task, the point of explosion was random for each 
balloon, sampled without replacement from a list ranging from 1 to 128. Every ten points 
gained in the task equated to a gain of £0.05. 
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Figure 4. Screenshot from a trial of the BART task using the Inquisit software package. 
The instructions for the BART were modified for the purpose of the present study. 
Participants were informed that they would play the game to earn money for the person 
whose name they found in the envelope on their desk (see procedure for further explanation). 
 
Self-reports of risk attitudes and personality.  
After completing the BART, participants were asked to complete a computer-based 
questionnaire. As a manipulation check, participants were asked to confirm that they were 
aware for whom they had played the BART game, selecting one of the three options: 
“myself”, “a friend who came with me to the experiment”, “other people in the session”. 
They were also asked to type in the name of the person for whom they played the game. If 
participants had not played for themselves or for the friend who came with them, they were 
asked whether they personally knew the person (stranger) for whom they played (all 
participants selected “no”). All participants were also asked how long they had known their 
friend (in months, ranging from 0 to 100), how much time they spend together (in hours per 
week, ranging from 0 to 150), and how close they are to them (on a scale from 1 to 10, 
ranging from not close at all to extremely close). 
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Participants were also asked about their own risk-taking behaviour. First, they were 
prompted to indicate how risky they think they are, relative to other people. They were shown 
a picture of a row of people who were ordered from “people who are least likely to take 
risks” to “people who are most likely to take risks”, and instructed to click on a location 
within this row to indicate where they thought they fell in terms of their risk taking (ten 
categories). Those who completed the BART for others were also asked to answer the same 
type of question about the person with whom they were partnered. Finally, for exploratory 
purposes, all participants completed a 30-item DOSPERT to assess their risk taking in five 
domains of life – financial, health and safety, recreational, ethical and social (Weber et al., 
2002) – as well as a 30-item BFI personality measure, assessing openness, conscientiousness, 




Sessions were conducted in groups with four to six pairs of participants. Random allocation 
to conditions occurred at the group level, so all participants in a single session were allocated 
to the self, friend, or stranger condition. Participants were seated in individual computer 
cubicles and first listened to the instructions which were read by the experimenter. At this 
point they were informed that the envelope placed in front of them contained the name of a 
participant, present at the lab, who would be the recipient of the earnings in the balloon 
pumping task. Participants were asked to open the envelope and to start the computer task.  
On the screen, they were shown instructions explaining how the BART works and 
were reminded that all earnings made in the game would go to the person whose name they 
had found in the envelope (see Appendix for verbatim instructions). They were also informed 
that if they were not playing for themselves, their own earnings would be determined by the 
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performance of another person in the room who had found their name in their envelope. Upon 
completing the BART, participants were redirected to the online survey, where they were 
asked about their demographics (age, gender), knowledge of the person they played the game 
for, their association with their friend, their risk taking (both relative risk and partner’s risk 
taking as well as DOSPERT), and personalities (30-BFI), in that order (See Supplementary 
Material). 
After completing all tasks, participants were paid the show-up fee. The earnings from 
the BART were transferred to their student accounts within five working days, based on the 
performance of whoever had their name in the envelope (self, friend, stranger), exactly as 
described to the participants.  
 
Results 
Figure 5 shows how there were very small differences in the mean adjusted pumps 
between the three conditions (Mself = 43.1 ± 5.0; Mfriend = 46.5 ± 4.5; Mstranger = 43.2 ± 4.5). 
We tested whether condition made a difference to risk-taking in the BART with a one-way 
ANOVA, including condition as a factor and mean adjusted pumps as the dependent variable. 
Mean adjusted pumps was defined as the average number of pumps on trials that did not end 
with a balloon bursting. Consistent with Figure 5, there was no effect of condition, F(2, 143) 
= 0.65, p = 0.52, ηp
2= 0.009. Ex-post statistical power analyses indicated that, given the 
sample size, this test had 34% power for detecting an effect size d = 0.3, 80% for d = 0.5, and 
97% for d = 0.7. We also conducted a Bayesian version of the ANOVA to quantify the 
support for the null. Here we found decisive evidence in support of the model in which there 
are no differences between the conditions, BF10= 0.117 (conducted using JASP with default 
priors). 
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Figure 5. Mean adjusted pumps in the three conditions of Experiment 2. Dots represent 
individual data points, and the white rhomboids are the means for each condition. Bars 
represent 95% CI of the mean.  
Discussion 
As in Experiment 1, the results of Experiment 2 did not reveal any significant differences in 
participants’ willingness to take risky decisions according to whether they themselves, or 
another person, would receive the rewards. Moreover, Experiment 2 also revealed no 
differences according to whether the other person was a friend or a stranger. This pattern is 
not consistent with the hypothesis (P6), motivated by construal level theory, that reducing 
social distance to the recipient of the decision-making outcome should increase risk aversion. 
One possible reason why we did not observe any differences between the groups was that 
participants did not have information about their specific partner’s preferences with respect to 
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relied upon their own preferences in making decisions for others. We explored this possibility 
in Experiment 3. 
 
Experiment 3 
Experiment 3 investigated whether risky decision-making would differ according to whether 
the recipient of the decision-making outcome was individual or joint in a situation in which 
participants had reason to believe that the other person had different preferences regarding 
risk than they themselves had. Specifically, we asked whether participants would make 
riskier decisions when playing for joint rewards to be shared with a partner to whom they had 
reason to attribute a preference for high-risk decisions, compared to when they were playing 
for individual rewards. Here, our prediction follows from the blame-avoidance account, as 
knowing that a partner is risk seeking should encourage participants to be risk seeking when 
the outcomes are shared. Specifically, we predicted that: 
(P7) participants would make more risky decisions for a team than for themselves, given that, 
as in the context of this experiment, they have reason to believe that their teammate is risk 
seeking. 
We also aimed to test whether their willingness to take riskier decisions could be affected by 
increasing the degree of coordination between participants and their partners. Construal level 
theory and the blame avoidance hypothesis lead to opposite predictions in this case. The 
prediction based on the construal level theory is that coordinated action reduces 
psychological distance, and therefore should result in more risk-averse behaviour. 
Accordingly, construal level theory predicts:  
(P8a) that participants would make less risky decisions when coordinating with a risk-seeking 
partner than when not coordinating. 
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The blame-avoidance hypothesis predicts that a high degree of coordination may lead 
participants to make decisions that more closely accommodate the preferences they ascribe to 
their partners. Accordingly, the blame-avoidance hypothesis predicts: 
(P8b) that participants would make more risky decisions when coordinating with a risk-
seeking partner than when not coordinating. 
We tested these hypotheses using the BART, by manipulating (1) whether participants played 
for themselves or for a joint outcome and (2) whether they were coordinating or not with 
another player during the balloon pumping task. 
Method 
Participants  
We determined that a sample size of 76 would give 80% power for finding a small-to-
medium-sized effect (ηp
2 = .025) with an alpha of 0.05, assuming a two-way repeated-
measures ANOVA on normally distributed data. For the experiment, 79 participants (50 
females, 28 males, 1 undisclosed) were recruited through the University of Warwick’s online 
experiment recruitment system and were between the ages of 19 and 49 (Mage = 24.3, SDage = 
4.6). This slightly exceeded the pre-registered sample size of 76 because the experiment was 
conducted in large groups of 10-12, and participants sometimes cancelled, making it 
impossible to precisely target the desired sample size. Instead, the recruitment procedure was 
repeated until the target of 76 was met. Participants were paid a £4 show-up fee and an 
additional bonus of up to £7 based on their earnings. Two participants were excluded prior to 
analysis because there was at least one condition in which they never ended any trials prior to 
the balloon bursting, which meant there was no data for them for that condition, leaving a 
total sample size of 77. The experiment was conducted in accordance with the Declaration of 
Helsinki, and was approved by the Psychology Department Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of Warwick. 
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All procedural details, including hypotheses, recruited participant numbers, exclusion 





The program for the BART was written using PsychoPy (Version: 1.90.1, Peirce, 2007). The 
experimental task was preceded by a phase in which participants selected an avatar from a 
predetermined list to represent them during the experiment. The avatars were used to indicate 
whose outcome was at stake. When only the participant’s individual outcome was at stake, 
only the participant’s avatar was displayed; when a joint outcome was at stake, both the 
participant’s and their partner’s avatars were displayed. We also administered a paper-and-
pencil version of the DOSPERT questionnaire (See Supplementary Material). 
 
Procedure 
After giving informed written consent, participants were seated, in groups of 10-12, at 
desktop computers in individual workspaces within a larger lab space. Participants first 
selected their avatar and were then paired with a partner. This pairing process involved a very 
mild form of deception: participants were in fact paired with a virtual partner, who was 
programmed to make highly risk-seeking choices. This was necessary in order to maintain 
experimental control over the partner’s choices, and more specifically to implement our 
manipulation—i.e., it enabled us to probe participants’ decisions when paired with a partner 
whom they had reason to believe preferred a higher level of risk than they themselves did. 
Participants were informed that their bonus payment would be calculated based upon the 
number of pumps they achieved without bursting balloons (verbatim instructions are in the 
 Social risk 31 
Appendix). At the end of each experimental block, participants were informed of their 
earnings during that block. At the end of the experiment, the bonus payment was determined 
by calculating the mean number of pumps per trial during the individual baseline block, and 
dividing by ten—i.e., if the mean was forty, the participant received a bonus of £4, up to the 
maximum bonus payment of £7.   
To establish an individual baseline, each participant performed one baseline block of 
ten balloons individually. They were then informed of their partner’s baseline. The partner’s 
baseline was calculated using the following formula: Partner’s average baseline = Own 
average baseline + 0.25*(Max pumps – own average baseline). They were not informed of 
the partner’s earnings during the partner’s baseline block. This baseline block was followed 
by the four test blocks, one for each of the four experimental conditions, in counterbalanced 
order.  
In the Decisions-for-Self conditions, participants performed the task for rewards 
which accrued to them alone. In the Decisions-for-Team conditions, they performed the task 
for rewards which accrued to them and their partner jointly. The overall rewards in these 
blocks were twice as high as in the Decisions-for-Self conditions; this increase ensured that, 
when the rewards were split with the partner, participants could still achieve the same 
maximum payoffs as in the Decisions-for-Self conditions. 
In the Coordination conditions, participants and partners alternated pressing the key to 
pump the balloon, but it was always the participant who had the role of deciding 
when/whether to cash out and end the trial. In the No-Coordination conditions, participants 
pressed the key to pump the balloon while the partner waited. Participants decided when to 
cash out and end the trial.  
Each test block consisted of ten trials (i.e., ten balloons). Participants were informed 
that for each test block, either they or their partner would decide when to end each trial. 
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Because we were only interested in when participants decided to end trials, the participant 
was always selected to play the role of deciding when to end the trial. To make it plausible 
that this allocation was due to chance, we inserted a filler block in the middle of the four test 
blocks. The filler block had the same format as the No-Coordination condition with the 
partner in the role of the balloon pumper and decider, and playing only for the partner’s 
individual rewards -- i.e., the participant watched passively as the partner pumped the 
balloon, and the partner decided when to end the trials. 
At the end of the experiment, participants completed the DOSPERT questionnaire 
while awaiting payment (See Supplementary Material).  
 
 Results 
Figure 6 shows how exposure to a more risk-seeking partner influenced participants’ 
decisions, leading them to take greater risks even when working towards their own rewards. 
A two-tailed paired-sample t-test confirmed that participants made significantly more mean-
adjusted pumps in the No-Coordination-Decisions-for-Self condition (Mean ± 95% CI: 54.0 
± 5.4) than in the baseline condition (M = 36.3 ± 5.8), t(76) = 8.53, p < 0.001, d= 0.46, BF10= 
701 × 107. 
Next, we conducted a two-way repeated measures ANOVA with Coordination (Yes 
vs. No) and Decision-Outcome Recipient (Self vs. Team) as two within-subject factors. The 
results revealed no significant main effects of either Coordination or Decision-Outcome 
Recipient. The overall mean adjusted number of pumps was not different between the 
Coordination (52.4 ± 5.0), and the No-Coordination conditions (52.6 ± 5.3), F (1, 76) = 0.22, 
p = .64, ηp
2 = .003. Nor did we observe any significant difference in the overall mean adjusted 
number of pumps between the Decisions-for-Team (52.8 ± 5.2), and the Decisions-for-Self 
Conditions (M = 52.3 ± 5.1), F (1, 76) = 0.05, p = .82, ηp
2 =  .001. As in Experiment 1, we 
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also conducted a Bayesian version of the ANOVA to quantify the support for the null for the 
two factors Coordination and Decision-Outcome Recipient. Here we found decisive evidence 
in support of the model in which there are no differences between the conditions: BF10= 
0.131 for Coordination and BF10= 0.127 for Decision-Outcome Recipient. 
There was, however, a significant interaction between these two factors, F (1, 76) = 
8.21, p < .01, ηp
2 = .098, BF10 = 0.016. Looking at Figure 6, we can see that the mean 
differences between the groups were small. These small differences between Coordination 
and No-Coordination conditions, however, went in opposite directions for the Decisions-for-
Self and the Decisions-for-Team conditions, leading to the significant interaction. Post-hoc 
pairwise comparisons using a Bonferroni correction (alpha = .0125) revealed no significant 
difference in mean adjusted pumps between the Decisions-for-Self and the Decisions-for-
Team Conditions when there was coordination (t(76) = 1.79, p = .077, d = 0.21, BF10 = 
1.738), nor when there was no coordination (t(76) = 1.57, p = .122, d = 0.18, BF10 = 2.453). 
Similarly, there was no significant difference in mean adjusted pumps between the 
Coordination and the No Coordination Conditions when participants decided for the team 
(t(76) = 1.35, p = .182, d = 0.15, BF10 = 3.318), nor when they decided for themselves, 
though this latter comparison was borderline, t(76) = 2.44, p = .017, d = 0.28, BF10 = 2.015 . 
Ex-post statistical power analyses indicated that, given the sample size and an alpha level of 
.0125, all these tests had 57% power for detecting an effect size d = 0.3, 99% for d = 0.5, and 
100% for d = 0.7. 
 Social risk 34 
 
Figure 6.  Mean adjusted BART score for the baseline condition and for the test conditions, 
split by the recipient of the decision outcome and whether or not there was coordination. Dots 
represent individual data points, and rhomboids represent the mean. Error bars represent 95% 
CI of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 was designed to investigate whether participants would make riskier decisions 
when performing the BART for rewards to be shared with a riskier partner, compared to 
when they were playing for individual rewards. We also aimed to test whether willingness to 
take riskier decisions could be increased by increasing the degree of coordination between 
participants and their partners.  
People made riskier decisions after having been exposed to a risk-seeking partner, 
compared to their own individual baseline. This increase indicates that observing the choices 
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coordination nor the decision target, however, had a significant impact across the board. 
Participants did not make riskier decisions when coordinating with a risk-seeking partner than 
when not coordinating (P8a; P8b), and they did not make riskier decisions when performing 
the task for team rewards than when only their own individual outcome was at stake (P7).  
 
  
General Discussion  
Across three experiments, with nearly 300 participants, we found that participants’ decisions 
about risk did not differ consistently according to whether it was their own outcome that was 
at stake, or that of a friend, a stranger or a teammate. They consistently chose for others as 
they chose for themselves.  
 These results have important implications for theoretical proposals which have been 
developed to account for differences between risky decision-making for self and others. For 
example, construal level theory hypothesizes that decision-making for others may be 
characterized by greater psychological distance than decision-making for oneself. As a result, 
people may use relatively abstract, context-independent and reason-driven considerations 
when deciding for others, which would lead to participants being more risk seeking when 
deciding for others than for themselves. The results of Experiments 1 and 2, in which we 
found no differences between self and other, are not consistent with this prediction. In 
Experiment 2, we also manipulated the nature of the relationship with the recipient (Friend vs 
Stranger). Assuming the social distance to a friend is less than the social distance to a 
stranger, construal level theory would predict that participants would make more risk-seeking 
decisions for a stranger than for a friend. Again, however, we observed no reliable 
differences. In Experiment 3, if we conceptualize the coordination manipulation as reducing 
social distance to the partner, then construal level theory predicts more risk averse decision-
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making in the Coordination than in the No-Coordination condition. In fact, however, the 
results do not show this pattern.  
One possible explanation for why we did not observe a significant difference between 
coordinating and not coordinating when deciding for joint rewards with a risk-seeking partner 
is that coordination may have triggered two distinct factors pulling in opposite directions: on 
the one hand, coordination may have made participants more inclined to choose as they 
believed the partner wanted (i.e., more risk seeking). This tendency is consistent with 
research showing that coordination increases a sense of commitment to a partner, increasing 
the willingness to act in accordance with the expectations one takes that partner to have 
(Michael, Sebanz & Knoblich, 2016; Rusch & Luetge 2016). On the other hand, coordination 
may have reduced psychological distance to the partner, leading participants to choose in a 
more risk-averse fashion. 
A further theoretical proposal that has been offered in the literature is that differences 
in decision-making for self and others may be driven by an anticipation of blame in the event 
of a negative outcomes for others (Botti, Orfali, & Iyengar, 2009; Simonson, 1992; Stone et 
al., 2002; Wang et al., 2017). Kray (2000) suggested that people making decisions for others 
were more likely to choose options that scored highest on the most important choice 
attributes, as this would ensure a valid justification that could help reduce any potential blame 
if the outcome is suboptimal. This line of thought suggests that in Experiment 1, participants 
would place more weight on social information when deciding for their partner than when 
deciding for themselves. This emphasis arises because information about the choices 
previously made by other participants would provide a basis for justifying the decision and 
thereby minimizing blame. The results of Experiment 1, however, do not corroborate this 
prediction.  
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The blame-avoidance hypothesis also generates the prediction that participants in 
Experiments 1 and 2 should make more conservative choices, and thus be more risk averse 
when deciding for others, in order to minimize the risk of blame. Again, our results do not 
support this hypothesis. As a further test of this idea, participants in Experiment 3 were 
provided with information about their specific partner’s personal preference with respect to 
risk tolerance. Under these circumstances, we reasoned that the blame-avoidance hypothesis 
would predict greater risk-seeking. Insofar as blame-avoidance is a critical factor in decision-
making for others, participants should be inclined to use this information to align their 
decisions with the decisions their partner could be expected to make (although it must be 
acknowledged that the blame-avoidance hypothesis is not unique in generating this 
prediction; people may align with others’ preferences for many other reasons). Given that 
they had reason to ascribe a preference for high risk-seeking to their partners in Experiment 
3, this should lead to greater risk-seeking. And yet we do not see this pattern. One possible 
explanation is that different motives aiming to avoid blame pulled in different directions in 
this context. That is, the information that participants had about their partner’s preferences 
may have elicited a tendency to accommodate those preferences, which would have pulled 
participants towards more risk-seeking decisions. At the same time, a distinct motive to avoid 
very bad outcomes may have neutralized any such tendency by pulling participants towards 
more conservative decision-making. 
A different lens through to which to view the current results is through the learning of 
the preferences of others (Behrens et al., 2008). The consistency with which participants 
chose the same option for their partner as for themselves may be due to participants applying 
their own risk preference when making decisions for others, because they did not know what 
preferences their partners held. In other words, the results of Experiment 1 showed no 
difference between decisions made for self and for other because participants were making 
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decisions for “a random other participant in the room” without knowing their preferences. 
Similarly, it may be that there was no difference in decisions for a stranger or friend in 
Experiment 2 because participants were not aware of the risk preferences of their partners. 
Supporting this interpretation, the ratings of strangers’ and friends’ riskiness were not 
associated with number of pumps participants made for each type of partner. In Experiment 
3, however, participants had direct experience of their partner’s preference and may have 
adapted this not only for the team decisions, but also for their own, possibly because they 
adopted a new strategy in the task by learning from their partner (Suzuki, Jensen, Bossaerts, 
& O’Doherty, 2016).  
This interpretation suggests that in order to decide differently for others than for 
oneself, decision-makers may need to be aware of any differences between their own 
preferences and the preferences of the person for whom they are deciding. In other words, the 
absence of knowledge about the preferences of others in Experiments 1 and 2 may explain 
why participants chose for others as for themselves. In contrast, when participants were 
provided with information about the preferences of the other (Experiment 3), we observed a 
shift in participants’ risky decisions (cf. Suzuki et al., 2016). After learning the risk 
preference of their partners, participants adjusted their risk preferences to correspond more to 
their partner’s when they were coordinating as a team. If this is correct, it implies that such 
factors as generic guilt- and blame-avoidance are secondary insofar as their influence will 
strongly depend upon what people believe about the preferences of the other individual. 
The findings observed here provide reason to doubt that there are any general 
differences in attitudes towards risk between decision-making for self and decision-making 
for others. Rather, it may be the case that some factors incline people towards more risky 
decision-making for others, whereas some other factors incline people towards less risky 
decision-making for others. If so, we may observe more or less risky decision-making for 
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others than for oneself, or no difference at all, depending on which factors predominate. This 
interpretation is consistent with the findings of a recent review and meta-analysis, which 
concluded that “self-other decision making differences are robust – the differences may not 
produce large effects, but they yield many small- to-medium effects. And because these 
differences occur in different kinds of decisions and situations, there does not appear to be an 
overall risky or cautious shift that manifests across all decisions” (Polman & Wu, 2019: 34). 
Indeed, building on this point, our findings highlight the possibility that some factors may 
have different effects in different contexts: the results of Experiment 3 suggest that 
coordination with a teammate may have opposite effects on risky decision-making depending 
on whether one is deciding on behalf of oneself or on behalf of the team (see Fig 6). If this is 
correct, it would contribute to explaining the mixed pattern of results that we find in the 
literature, as well as the lack of clear differences in the three experiments here. Further 
research should probe this possibility by attempting to identify more specifically the 
circumstances under which psychological distance and blame-avoidance may be expected to 
predominate.  
In evaluating our findings, it is also important to consider two methodological points. 
The first is that, in contrast to most previous studies investigating self-other differences in 
risky decision-making, we implemented decision-from-experience paradigms rather than 
decision-from description paradigms in all three of our experiments. It is becoming 
increasingly clear that experience reduces decision-making biases. In particular, one recent 
meta-analysis by Wulff et al. (2018) revealed that decisions from experience align relatively 
well with expected-value maximization – i.e. the authors found no evidence for the over-
weighting of small probabilities and loss aversion. It may well be that self-other differences 
in risky decision-making emerge predominantly in one-shot decisions based on descriptions 
rather than based on experience. Secondly, Experiments 1 and 3 did both involve very minor 
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forms of deception. If participants suspected this, then this may have played a role in their 
decision-making. We did, however, go to great lengths to ensure that participants would not 
suspect the deception (always having 12 participants in the lab for each session in Experiment 
3, for example), and we do not believe that participants in our experiments would have been 
more likely to speculate about the possibility of deception or about the hypotheses than 
participants in any other experiments. And indeed, the fact that they did align their decisions 
with the social information we provided suggests that they took that information at face 
value.  
In future research, it would also be important to explore individual differences in the 
motives underlying decision-making for others. As Olschewski, Dietsch, & Ludvig (2019) 
have shown, for example, competitive motives may lead some people to make suboptimal 
decisions for others. It would also be valuable to further investigate the effects we observed 
of social information upon risky decision-making. In particular, in Experiments 3, 
participants wound up earning more money as a result of integrating information about how 
others had chosen. This may have important practical implications, insofar as it suggests that 
pairs of people with conflicting biases may make better decisions when exposed to each 
other’s risk preferences than either would make alone. Future research is needed to explore 
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